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the statute are not met the defendant's liability is the same as at
common law, with general damage to reputation presumed. The
practical result of this statute is similar to the result under the per
quod rule, i.e., it is only in the exceptional cases that money damages
will be recovered. The major difference is that with the statute the
plaintiff's name would be cleared and the vindicatory function of
the action served.
REED JOHNSTON, JR.

Eminent Domain-Agriculture-Evidence--Just Compensation
for Allotment Bearing Land
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 and its subsequent
amendments provide a complex scheme for the regulation of the
production of certain agricultural commodities. 1 Under the act, the
Secretary of Agriculture determines what acreage requirements of
each commodity will be required by the nation. This overall requirement is then apportioned by states, counties, and farms. Local committees at the county level apportion the allotment among the farms
on which the commodity has been produced. The basis for the
apportionment is the commodity production history of each farm,
taking into consideration past production of the commodity, suitability of the land, available equipment for production, crop rotation practices, and other physical factors that affect the production
of the commodity.'
It is through this generally outlined statutory scheme that a
farm's eligibility and attainment of an acreage allotment for a specific commodity is determined.
The receipt of an allotment is noticeably self-perpetuating for
the basis for award is heavily weighed on the commodity productive
history and the suitability of the individual farm.3 The allotment
is made to the farm itself and not to the person who operates or
owns the farm and, therefore, runs with the land.' The act does
' E.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 [hereinafter cited as Act of
1938], §§ 311-15, 52 Stat. 31 (1938), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1311-15 (1964),
as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1313(j)-14 (Supp. I, 1965). These commodities
are: tobacco, cotton, corn, wheat, rice, and peanuts.
'E.g., Act of 1938, § 313, added by 52 Stat. 47 (1938), as amended, 7
U.S.C. § 1313(b) (1964).

'Ibid.
'See Chandler v. Davis, 350 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382

1966]

EMINENT DOMAIN

not, as a general rule, sanction the sale or transfer 5 of commodity
allotments apart from the land to which they are attached.' The
notable exception7 is the condemnation of allotment bearing land
by any federal, state, or other agency having the power of
eminent domain.8 The importance of this exception in the subsequent evaluation of this condemned allotment bearing land merits
closer examination.
Under section 1378 of the act,9 the farmer is allowed to transfer
an agricultural commodity allotment which has been lost as a result
of the condemnation of the allotment bearing land. When allotment
bearing land is taken by the power of eminent domain, the allotment
is placed in an allotment pool and reserved for transfer to other
land presently owned or to be subsequently purchased by the displaced farmer."0 The statute provides that:
Upon application to the county committee, within three years
after the date of such displacement ....

any owner so displaced

shall be entitled to have established for other farms owned by
him allotments which are comparable with allotments determined
for other farms in the same area which are similar

. .

. Provided,

That the acreage used to establish or increase the allotments for
such farms shall be transferred from the pool and shall not exceed the allotment most recently established for the farm acquired from the applicant and placed in the pool."
Thus, depending on the suitability" and location of the substitute
U.S. 977 (1966); Hart v. Hassel, 250 F. Supp. 893 (E.D.N.C. 1966); Byrd
v. Freeman, 252 N.C. 724, 114 S.E.2d 715 (1960).
' Since 1962 the lease from year-to-year of the right to grow and market
most varieties of tobacco has been allowed. See Act of 1938, § 316, added
by 75 Stat. 469 (1961), as amended, Food and Agriculture Act of 1965,
§ 703, 79 Stat. 1210 (1965), 7 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. I, 1965).
'Act of 1938, § 378(a), added by 72 Stat. 995 (1958), as amended, 7
U.SC. § 1378(a) (1964).
'There are exceptions in addition to the one under consideration here.
E.g., Act of 1938, § 344, 72 Stat. 186 (1958), 7 U.S.C. § 1344(n) (1964)
(relating to the loss of allotments as a result of natural disaster).
8
Act of 1938, § 378(a), added by 72 Stat. 995 (1958), as amended, 7
U.S.C. § 1378(a) (1964).
°Ibid.
"0Where the condemned land represents less than 15 per cent of the total
crop land on the farm, the allotment attributable to that portion of the
farm condemned is transferred to the part of the farm not so taken. See
Act of 1938, § 378(c), added by 72 Stat. 995 (1958), as amended, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1378(c) (1964).
1
Act of 1938, § 378(a), added by 72 Stat. 995 (1958), as amended, 7
U.S.C. § 1378(a) (1964).
" Suitability in this context means land that has productive qualities
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land that is available, a displaced farmer may have his pooled allotment transferred in its entirety or in a lesser amount. The condemnee also stands to lose the allotment and its section 1378 right
if he fails to apply for transfer within the three year period. 3 In
addition, a regulation 4 imposed by the Administrator of the Commodity Stabilization Service conditions the right of a displaced farmer to transfer his allotment on a showing that the acquisition of the
substitute land was solely for the purpose of reestablishing farming
operations and is not a scheme to sell or transfer the allotment for
the benefit of someone other than the condemnee. It also requires a
certification by the farmer that no agreements have been made with
any person for the purpose of obtaining an allotment for that person.' 5 In United States v. Citrus Valley Farms, Inc.'" the United
States acquired farm land needed for the construction of a dam
and reservoir. The farm possessed a 550 acre cotton allotment
which was placed in the county allotment pool in accordance with
the act and was subsequently transferred to other land prior to
trial.Y7
The dispossessed owners were awarded compensation for the land
on the basis of the fair market value of Citrus Valley Farms with the
allotment included less the "monetary value, if any, established by a
preponderance of the evidence, of the section 1378 right retained
by the defendant.. 8 The jury fixed the value of the land including
the allotment at 1,025,000 dollars and the deductible value of the
separated section 1378 right to the owner at zero.
The Government, on appeal, contended that the court was awarding compensation for more than had been taken because under the
act the owner retains the allotment and it should follow that the
measure of compensation should be the value of the land without the
allotment.'" It was also contended by the Government that by valusuitable for the commodity in question and no existing allotment or a present

allotment small enough to be increased without exceeding the allotments
allowed
for comparable farms in the locality. Ibid.
13 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
"17C.F.R. § 719.11(f)(3) (1965).

C.F.R. § 719.11(f)(1) (1965).
'7
16350 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1965).
1, See United States v. 3296.82 Acres of Land, 222 F. Supp. 173 (D.
Ariz. 1963) (pretrial memorandum).
" 350 F.2d at 685 n.2.
"0This formula for evaluation was used in a condemnation proceeding
involving North Carolina allotment bearing land. See Austin v. Jackson,

353 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1965).
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ing the section 1378 right at zero they failed "to give any consideration at all to an item of obvious value."2 Nevertheless, in affirming,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
the enhancement of the condemned land resulting from the presence
of an allotment, reduced by the value of the section 1378 right to
the condemnee, must be included in the determination of just compensation. 2
The court's rejection of the Government's formula for determining the measure of compensation is soundly based in its recognition that the term "allotment" has a multiple meaning; the allotment
attached to the original land and the section 1378 right to transfer
it elsewhere are not the same. The court said that an allotment is
not only a "license to produce," but is also a "measure of the land's
proven productive value."2'2 From this court's interpretation it is
clear that when allotment bearing land is condemned the loss to the
condemnee is the value of his land with the allotment included
(measure of the land's proven productive quality); while all that
remains is the conditional section 1378 right to transfer the allotment to some substitute land (license-to-produce).
The Government also contended that the allotment will automatically increase the value of any lands to which it might be
transferred in amount precisely equal to its enhancement of the
lands from which it was severed.
This position clearly overlooks
the multiple character of the allotment. The Government's formula
for evaluation would attribute to the retained section 1378 right
"enhancement values earned by the land from which it was severedcharacteristics which the land retains and which cannot be severed
by the owner and transferred to other land."2
The difficulty of applying this court's formula for the measure
of compensation is in the determination of the deductible value of
the retained section 1378 right to transfer.
The court in the principal case failed to establish any recognizable criteria for evaluating this section 1378 right, but by reconsidering the nature of the right certain applicable considerations
become apparent. First, it must be recognized that there is always
20350 F.2d at 686.
1Id.at 687.
22Id. at 686.
23 Id. at 686.
2
Id.at 686.
2
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the possibility that the displaced farmer will choose to relinquish
his section 1378 right in order to retire from farming. In this event
nothing should be deducted and the reserved allotment should become immediately available to the local committee to be reapportioned to other farms. 25 Nothing in the act makes the exercise of
a section 1378 right mandatory upon the displaced farmer; a court
should allow the voluntary renouncement of this optional right without prejudice. " '
If the displaced farmer chooses to exercise his section 1378
right, and does so prior to trial, its deductible value can be conveniently calculated by reference to the identifiable substitute land
as was done in the principal case.2 In this situation the court should
consider the productive capacity of the substitute land, conversion
costs, conversion time, availability of labor, access to market, availability of water, and other characteristics of the substitute land.2 8
Furthermore, the presence of an existing allotment on the substitute
land may prevent the total section 1378 right from being exercised. 29
Difficulty arises when the displaced farmer has neither relinquished nor exercised his section 1378 right prior to trial. Here,
since the court has no concrete reference it must look at the availability of other non-allotment bearing land, the location of this land,
as well as the applicable considerations discussed in relation to specific substitute land. Moreover, the basis of the evaluation should
include the possibility that the 1378 right will not be exercised
within the three years and therefore lost,30 the inability of the farm2 "Since pooled allotments are part of the National, State, and county
allotments, the release and reapportionment of such allotments would not add
any acreage that was not contemplated when the national allotment was
established." S. REP. No. 172, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1727, 1728 (1961)
(letter of Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture).
2
judge Foley, concurring, argued that the requirement for just compensation prohibits the deduction of the value of the section 1378 right in
any situation. 350 F.2d at 687.
" One commentary suggests delaying all condemnation proceedings until
the three year transfer period has run or until the farmer has exercised
his section 1378 right as a possible solution to the difficulty in determining
the deductible value. See 41 WASH. L. REv. 615 (1966).
"8The court in the principal case considered the availability of similar
non-allotment bearing land, availability of convertible non-allotment bearing
land, cost of conversion, and the time required for conversion. 350 F.2d at
687.
207 C.F.R. § 719.11(f)(5) (1965). This regulation prevents the use of
the section 1378 right by a farmer who buys a farm with an existing allotaverage.
to or in excess of the county
ment-acreage ratio equal remain
in the pool for one or more crop years . .
80

"Where allotments
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er to sell his 1378 right,3 the strict regulations restricting its use and
benefit solely to the condemnee, 32 and the possible loss of all or a
portion of the right due to a present allotment on the available
substitute land."
The result of these contingencies is to make the deductible value
of the retained section 1378 right highly speculative.34 Given this
uncertainty, it is not surprising that the jury in the principal case
found that the section 1378 right to transfer was unprofitable and
of no value to the displaced farmer.
The possible application and import of the Citrus Valley Farms
case in North Carolina should not be overlooked. North Carolina
enjoys allotments of every type provided for under the act. The
increasing use of condemnation proceedings by federal, state, and
other agencies for parks, highways, forest reserves, military reservations, water conservation and utilities will undoubtedly affect much
North Carolina allotment bearing land.
The North Carolina courts, in the evaluation of property taken
by the power of eminent domain35 have generally measured just
compensation by the fair market value of the property taken, computed at the time of the taking.36 Fair market value has been determined by the consideration of all elements and capabilities of the
land and all uses to which it is reasonably adapted in accordance
with the land's best and highest capabilities.37
it is generally due to inability of the former owner to locate immediately
and purchase other suitable farms to which the pooled allotments could be
transferred for continuation of farming." S. RElP. No. 172, 87th Cong., 1st

Sess. 1727, 1728 (1961) (letter of Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture).
,' See note 6 supra and accompanying

text.
See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
,' See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
* There is also a "windfall" possibility where the section 1378 right
could be more valuable than the allotment to the taken land resulting from
a transfer of the allotment upon condemnation from an area of poor productivity to one of greater productivity. This possibility is enhanced since
the act does not prohibit the transfer to other areas or even states. See, in
connection with the principal case, Westfall, Agricultural Allotments as
Property,
79 HARv. L. REV. 1180, 1194 (1966).
5
North Carolina has no eminent domain provision in its constitution.
However, just compensation by the state has been held required by Art. I,
§ 17 of the North Carolina Constitution. See Sale v. Highway Comm'n,
242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290 (1955); Eller v. Board of Educ., 242 N.C.
584, 89 S.E.2d 144 (1955).
" See In re Land of Alley, 252 N.C. 765, 114 S.E.2d 635 (1960); De
Bruhl v. Highway Comm'n, 247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d 229 (1958); City of
Statesville v. Anderson, 245 N.C. 208, 95 S.E.2d 591 (1956).
"' See Highway Comm'n v. Conrad, 263 N.C. 394, 139 S.E.2d 553 (1965);
22
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A comparison of the North Carolina court's measure of just
compensation with the Government's requested measure of compensation for condemned allotment bearing land either in the principal
case (the value of the land without the allotment) or as requested
in the pretrial memorandum88 (value of similar non-allotment bearing land) will find the two at odds. The North Carolina courts in
considering all elements, capabilities and uses of condemned allotment bearing land could hardly justify the exclusion of evidence
pertaining to the presence of an allotment as a measure of the productivity and capability of the land. 39
The North Carolina court also adheres to the doctrine that fair
market value is to be ascertained by assuming the existence of a
buyer who is ready, willing, and able to buy but is under no compulsion to do so. 41 It is evident that a buyer would place a higher
value on land which was or had possessed a commodity allotment
than he would place on similar non-allotment bearing land. The
allotment would reflect the productive history of the land, prove the
land immediately productive of the commodity, and prove that the
land had been, for retention of the allotment, rotated and tilled to41
ward continued and improved production of the commodity.
The North Carolina court has also admitted as evidence of an
element of market value the consequences of a general governmental
policy, such as the enhanced value resulting from zoning restrictions applicable to the land as they reflect the land's highest and best
use42 and the enhanced value resulting from roads, highways, parks
or other public uses on or adjacent to the condemned land which
were established through the governmental power of eminent domain. Since an agricultural allotment is also considered a general
Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hinkle, 260 N.C. 423, 132 S.E.2d 761 (1963);
Natahala Power & Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N.C. 200, 17 S.E.2d 10 (1941).
" United States v. 3296.82 Acres of Land, 222 F. Supp. 173, 175 (D.
Ariz. 1963).
"The bearing of the productive character of the land on the market
value in condemnation proceedings was considered in Creighton v. Water
Comm'rs, 143 N.C. 171, 172, 55 S.E. 511, 511 (1906).
"O
See Barnes v. Highway Comm'n, 250 N.C. 378, 109 S.E.2d 219 (1959);
Gallimore v. Highway Comm'n, 241 N.C. 350, 85 S.E.2d 392 (1955);
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Sloan, 227 N.C. 151, 41 S.E.2d 361 (1947).
dl See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
"See Northgate Shopping Center, Inc. v. Highway Comm'n, 265 N.C.
209, 143 S.E.2d 244 (1965); Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hinkle, 260 N.C.
423, 132 S.E.2d 761 (1963); Barnes v. Highway Comm'n, 250 N.C. 378,
109 S.E.2d 219 (1959).

19661

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

governmental policy,4 8 it follows that the North Carolina court
would consider the presence of an allotment equally admissible as
evidence in the determination of just compensation.
From the foregoing it would seem that there is no reason why
the North Carolina courts would refuse to allow evidence of the
presence of a commodity allotment to be presented and considered
44
in the evaluation of condemned land.
ALGERNON

L.

BUTLER, JR.

Evidence-Executive Privilege For Aircraft Accident Report
The crash of an Air Force bomber has again brought before
the court a claim of executive privilege for the Air Force Aircraft
Accident Report. The Supreme Court of the United States sustained the privilege in a now famous case, United States v. Reynolds,' on the ground that military secrets were contained in the
accident report. In the instant case, O'Keefe v. Boeing Co.,2 the
privilege was asserted on other grounds.
Plaintiffs, the surviving member of the crew and personal representatives of six crew members killed in the accident, instituted an
action for wrongful death and personal injuries against the aircraft manufacturer in the federal district court on the ground of
diversity of citizenship. 3 The complaint in O'Keefe alleged negligence and breach of warranty by Boeing Company. In pretrial proceedings, plaintiffs moved for discovery and inspection 4 of Air Force
"'[Ain increment added to the value of land by a governmental
policy is not to be deducted from the fair market value of land condemned in order to arrive at the amount of the just compensation
which must be paid therefor .... For instance it would obviously
be impossible as a practical matter to deduct from the fair market
value of agricultural land all elements of its value due to the Government's agricultural policy.
Iriarte v. United States, 157 F.2d 105, 111 (lst Cir. 1946).
"The principal case is the only case this writer has found that directly
confronts and considers the problem.
- 345 U.S. 1 (1953). Executive privilege was asserted by the Secretary
of Air Force for the accident report of a B-29 crash. Sustaining the
privilege, the Court held that an examination in camera of the report was
unnecessary where the court is satisfied that military secrets are involved.
38 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
'28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1964).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 34. This rule provides in part:

